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Abstract
There has been increasing concern about the inuence of elements of family background
on children's future outcomes in Japan. This paper empirically examines the long-term impact
of family background, including sibling composition and parental attributes, and reveals how
these elements of Japanese women's family backgrounds affect their educational attainment
and investment, labor market outcomes, family formation, and spousal characteristics.
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1 Introduction
Inequality persists from one generation to the next. The extent to which economic and social
status is transmitted across generations depends on the inuence of family background on future
economic and social outcomes. Growing concern about the increasing inuence of family back-
ground seems to be the reason behind the expansion of child benets and tuition subsidies after the
recent change of government in Japan.1 Some evidence, in fact, suggests that educational choices
have become more susceptible to credit constraints, under which family background plays a more
important role in determining children's future outcomes. First, the costs of attending a national
university jumped six fold in real terms from 1975 to 2000 (Figure 1).2 The OECD (2010) places
Japan in the group of countries with high tuition fees and less nancial support for students when
classifying countries into four groups according to tuition fees and nancial support systems for
students.3 Second, more than 90% of the sample used for the analysis in this paper relied on par-
ents for a large part or almost the entire amount of their tuition fees and living expenses (Table 1).
Finally, when educational attainment is classied into three groups according to parental perma-
nent income, 38.7% of those in the high-income group have university degrees, compared to only
8.6% (20.7%) of those in the low-income (middle-income) group (Table 2). In the light of these
circumstances, this paper provides empirical evidence of how family background affects educa-
tional attainment and how its impact has changed over recent decades. The paper also examines
parental investment in students' preparing for entrance examination or in their early education to
provide an explanation of the difference in educational attainment by family background.
1Under the new child benet scheme of 2010, households with children under the age of 15 receive monthly
allowances of 13,000 yen per child without an income limit. Under the new tuition waiver program of 2010, tuition is
waived for students in public high schools, and tuition aid is provided to students in private high schools.
2Costs for universities are calculated as the sum of enrollment fees and tuition fees for four years, normalized by
the consumer price index at the 2000 level. The ratio of costs for national universities to the average costs for private
universities was 23.5% in 1975 but rose to 63.6% in 2000. It has been uncommon for Japanese universities to offer to
exempt students from tuition fees or grant generous scholarships or student loans on a merit basis, although there has
been a recent trend of introducing merit-based scholarship programs and tuition exemptions as a way to attract students
amid the declining younger population. Existing scholarship programs have not expanded in recent decades. The Japan
Scholarship Foundation provides scholarships that are most accessible to college and graduate students; however, the
proportion of interest-free scholarships from the Japan Scholarship Foundation has dramatically decreased due to a
rise in the previous outstanding loans of scholarship recipients and a drop in government subsidies. The Ministry of
Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (2008) reports that, in 2007, 9.2% of college students received
interest-free scholarships and 19.7% received interest-bearing scholarships from the Japan Scholarship Foundation.
3The other three groups are Nordic countries, which have no or low tuition fees and generous nancial support;
Anglo-Saxon countries, which have high tuition fees and generous nancial support; and continental European coun-
tries, which have low tuition fees and less nancial support.
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Becker and Lewis (1973), Becker and Tomes (1976), and Becker (1991) provide a theoretical
foundation for investigating parental investment in children's education. The underlying idea of the
theory is that a tradeoff exists between quantity and quality of children; that is, all else being equal,
sibship size should be negatively associated with educational attainment. Subsequent empirical
studies support this hypothesis (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980; Hanushek 1992). The theoretical
model can be extended such that parental preferences and the education production function are
allowed to differ by birth order and gender (Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman, 1982, 1989). In this
case, birth order and the gender composition of siblings can affect children's future achievement,
holding sibship size constant.4 The main interest in these studies lies in the relation between
sibling structure and children's educational attainment; thus, parental attributes typically serve
as controls in the econometric models.5 The relation between parental attributes and children's
outcomes is, however, an equally important issue. There is considerable interest in the effects of
parental education (Ermisch and Francesconi, 2001; Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2002), maternal
age at birth (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1995), and parental income (Kane, 1994) on educational
attainment. This paper considers all these factors that can determine children's future outcomes.
While voluminous research has been conducted regarding the impact of family background
on educational attainment, less work has been done until recently regarding its impact on educa-
tional investment; labor market outcomes, such as wages and occupation (Olneck and Bills, 1979;
Kessler, 1991); family formation, such as fertility (Fernández and Fogli, 2006; Booth and Kee,
2009); and family income (Chadwick and Solon, 2002).6 However, each of the outcomes should be
worth investigating to understand the several implications of family background effects in the labor
4A rst-born child benets from educational investment more than later-born children in the United States
(Behrman and Taubman, 1986). The number of brothers decreases years of education, but the number of sisters
does not necessarily decrease years of education in Taiwan (Parish and Willis, 1993). The number of brothers reduces
the probability of university enrolment more than the number of sisters in Japan (Ono, 2004). The presence of sisters
decreases women's educational attainment in the United States (Butcher and Case, 1994).
5Parental attributes are sometimes subsumed in common effects shared by siblings and treated as a family xed
effect (Griliches, 1979).
6However, extensive literature exists on the production function for cognitive achievement in children. See Todd
and Wolpin (2003) for a survey. Vast literature exists on intergenerational transmission of economic status. See Solon
(1999) and Black and Devereux (2010) for surveys on intergenerational mobility, Ueda (1999) for intergenerational
earnings mobility in Japan, and Francesconi and Nicoletti (2007) for intergenerational transmission of occupational
prestige in the United Kingdom. Sociologists and demographers have accumulated evidence on intergenerational
transmission of fertility patterns. For example, Kahn and Anderson (1992) show that daughters of teen mothers are
more likely to give birth during the teen years in the United States. They also nd that teen childbearing occurs within
marriage for the majority of whites and outside marriage for the majority of blacks.
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market and the marriage market. First, success in the labor market may be associated with family
background via human capital accumulation or nepotism. Second, given the empirical evidence
that sibship size decreases educational attainment, fertility is a conceivably important element in
the intergenerational transmission process. Third, because births outside marriage are still rare,7
completed fertility hinges on the timing of marriage in Japan, and therefore, family background
may inuence the timing of marriage. In fact, the probability of staying single becomes lower as
the number of sisters or the number of brothers increases, while it becomes higher as maternal
education or paternal education increases (Figure 2). Lastly, in the light of the observed assortative
mating with respect to educational attainment (Table 3), family background can inuence whom
one marries. Assortative mating is presumably a key factor contributing to the intergenerational
transmission of economic status, but relatively little is known about how each element of family
background can affect family formation and spousal characteristics. Using an extensive set of fam-
ily background variables, this paper provides a comprehensive picture of the long-term impact of
family background on economic and social outcomes for Japanese women.
The analysis of this paper reveals that family background, including sibling composition and
parental attributes, indeed inuences educational attainment and investment, labor market out-
comes, and family formation. The impact of sibship size and parental income on university degrees
has increased along with rising educational expenses, while the differential impact of brothers and
sisters has disappeared for the younger cohorts. The inuence of family background appears both
in the labor market and in the marriage market. Signicant differences by family background are
found in the economic and social status of not only the woman but also that of her future husband.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data used in the
analysis, discusses econometric issues that can arise in the analysis of the paper, and presents the
preliminary results on the relation between family background and children's outcomes. Section 3
introduces econometric models to examine the impact of family background on various economic
outcomes. Section 4 provides empirical results for the inuences of the key elements of family
background. The nal section summarizes the main ndings of the paper.
7Cohabitation has also been rare in Japan. See Raymo, Iwasawa, and Bumpass (2009) and references therein for
details.
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2 Data
2.1 Family background variables
This study uses data from the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC) for the period from
1993 to 2004. The JPSC has surveyed a nationwide representative sample of women every year
since 1993. The original cohorts comprise 1,500 women aged 24 to 34 in 1993 (i.e., born between
1959 and 1969), and the new cohorts comprise 500 women aged 24 to 27 in 1997 (i.e., born
between 1970 and 1973) and 836 women aged 24 to 29 in 2003 (i.e., born between 1974 and
1979). The sample used for the analysis comprises 2,270 individuals whose parents are both alive,
of which 1,178 were born between 1959 and 1969 and 1,092 were born between 1970 and 1979.
The younger cohorts include the second baby-boomers born between 1971 and 1974.
The JPSC contains a wide array of information about family background including the number
of brothers, the number of sisters, birth order among sisters, the highest degree received by father
and mother, and the prefecture where the respondent spent the longest period of time during com-
pulsory education, all of which are given by nature and are invariant over time. Other available
information includes father's and mother's age, father's occupation,8 and parental annual income.
Table 4 shows that the distribution of the number of sisters is approximately symmetrical to that
of the number of brothers. The symmetric distribution implies that sex-selective abortion has not
been practiced in Japan, unlike in some other Asian countries where son preference is strong. El-
dest daughters account for 71.0% of the individuals in the sample, and second daughters account
for 24.8%. The proportion of those who hold some post-secondary academic degree is 57.1%,
whereas 23.5% of their fathers and 16.5% of their mothers hold some post-secondary academic
degree. In the course of popularization of higher education among women, the proportion of those
who hold a university degree has increased from 4% for the mothers' generation to 16% for the
current generation. The average maternal age at birth is 27.4 years, and the proportion of teenage
births is only 1.0%.
8Father's occupation is his current occupation if he has not yet retired, or his previous occupation otherwise. No
information is available about maternal occupation. Tanaka (2008) examines the effects of maternal employment on
children's educational attainment using the Japanese General Social Surveys.
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2.2 Intergenerational correlations
The analysis begins by presenting intergenerational correlations between parent and child and be-
tween parent and child's spouse. There are several econometric issues that arise in calculating
intergenerational correlations (Solon, 1992), and these problems are major concerns in the sub-
sequent main analysis. The issues are known as the life-cycle bias, the attenuation bias, and the
selection bias. First, because neither the lifetime income streams nor the entire career history is
usually observed, economic or social status is typically assessed by income or occupation at a
given point in time, and thus, it depends on the stage of life at which the individual is surveyed. To
correct for the life-cycle bias, the age of each family member and its square are partialled out. For
a similar reason, the value in the latest year of the survey is used for the number of children, and
the age and its square are partialled out in calculating the intergenerational correlation in fertility.
Second, economic or social status at a given point in time consists of transitory and permanent
components. To mitigate the attenuation bias caused by the transitory component, the average
value taken over the sample period is used for wages, income, and occupational prestige scores.
Finally, although the sample used here is not a particular subgroup of population, such as twins,
the selection bias can occur due to missing values as a consequence of selection into employment
or marriage. The selection problem is alleviated here by aggregating measures of economic and
social status over the sample period and is treated more formally in the next section.
The children's outcomes considered in Table 5 are educational attainment, hourly wages, oc-
cupational prestige, the timing of marriage, family size, and husband's income and occupational
prestige.9 Hourly wages represent productivity and economic status, while occupational pres-
tige represents social status and job amenity for which wages do not fully account. Occupational
prestige is measured using the Treiman scale (Treiman, 1977). The appendix describes the de-
tails of how the data on occupational prestige scores are constructed. The correlation coefcient
between occupational prestige scores and hourly wages is 0.40. Husband's income includes earn-
ings, business income, property income, and family transfers but excludes government transfers,
such as child care benets and social security benets. The intergenerational transmission of edu-
9Those who have never been employed during the sample period or never married until the latest year for which
data are available are not included in calculating the intergenerational correlations of wages, occupational prestige, or
age at rst marriage in Table 5, but are included in the subsequent regression analyses.
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cational attainment is relatively strong, as educational attainment can be more directly transmitted
by parental choices. The impact of parental income continues in the labor market, as represented
by its correlations with wages and occupational prestige. Family formation patterns are also cor-
related between parent and child, although the degree to which they are transmitted is weaker.
Spousal income and occupational prestige are correlated with parental income, despite the absence
of direct links, indicating that assortative mating in the marriage market plays a role in intergener-
ational mobility.10
3 Econometric Framework
The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of family background on educational at-
tainment and investment, labor market outcomes, family formation, and spousal characteristics.
Cross-sectional regressions are conducted for the analysis except for that of marriage. Time-
varying variables, such as wages, income, occupational prestige, children, and age, are treated
in the ways described in the previous section.
First, the linear regression model and binary and ordered probit models are used to analyze the
impact of family background on educational attainment and investment.
y1i = z1i1 + z2i2 + xi3 + u1i; (1)
where y1 is in general a latent variable that represents parental willingness to invest in children's
education; z1 is a vector of sibling composition that includes dummies for the number of sisters,
the number of brothers, and birth order; z2 is a vector of parental characteristics that includes
dummies for mother's years of education and father's years of education, maternal age at birth,
maternal age at birth squared, log parental income, father's age, and father's age squared; x is a
vector of other observed characteristics that includes age, age squared, prefecture dummies for
where one spent the longest period of time during compulsory education, log prefectural real GDP
10Social status is also transmitted across generations. The age-adjusted correlation coefcients in occupational
prestige are 0.207 with a p-value of zero between parent and child and 0.260 with a p-value of zero between parent
and child's spouse.
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at the subject's age of 16,11 and the high school studentteacher ratio at the subject's age of 16;12
u is the error term; and i indexes individuals.13 For the analysis of educational attainment, the
outcome variables used are the number of years of completed education and a binary response
variable for whether one has completed a four-year college degree or higher. For the analysis of
educational investment, the outcome variables used are a binary response variable for whether one
attended a preparatory school for university entrance examination as well as an ordered response
variable that takes a value of two if one attended both private tutoring schools and enrichment
courses, a value of one if one attended either, and a value of zero if one attended neither. The
error term is assumed to be normally distributed in the discrete choice models. The linear and
square terms for maternal age at birth are included to account for a rise or decline in its partial
effect. If children's future achievement is hindered by early or late childbearing, the optimal age
can be estimated by the turning point. Prefecture dummies and prefectural GDP are included to
isolate the inuence of family background owing to regional and macroeconomic effects. The high
school studentteacher ratio is included to control for the quality of education in the analysis that
examines changes in the impact of family background by cohort.
The impact of sibling composition is specied in two ways. First, it can be described by
z11 =
P
j
 
s1jd
s
j + 
b
1jd
b
j

, where dsj is an indicator variable for whether the number of sisters
is j, and dbj is an indicator variable for whether the number of brothers is j. This specication
allows the effect of an additional sister (brother) to vary with the number of sisters (brothers).
Whether educational investment is made preferentially in sons is an interesting question, because
such preference results in persistent gender inequality. The null hypothesis to test whether the
gender composition of siblings matters can be written as the joint hypothesis: s1j = 
b
1j for all j.
Alternatively, after conditioning on the number of siblings, birth order effect can be incorporated as
z11 = 
o
1d
o+
P
k 
bs
1kd
bs
k , where do is an indicator variable for whether one is the eldest daughter,
and dbsk is an indicator variable for whether the number of siblings is k. Birth order traditionally
11The prefectural GDP data are available from the Annual Report on Prefectural Accounts.
12Data on the number of students and teachers are available from the Basic Survey on Schools. National, prefectural,
and private high schools are all included in the calculation of the studentteacher ratio at the age of 16. Class size was
set at 45 students from 1964 to 1979 and at 40 students from 1980 to 2001 for public primary schools, junior high
schools, and high schools in Japan.
13Although no ability measure is available in the data used in this study, test scores, which are typical proxies for
innate ability, would not serve as good controls here because the difference in such measures is attributable to family
background.
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plays a role in determining intergenerational transfers. The inclusion of birth order can potentially
change the estimated coefcients on other family background variables.
Second, the sample selection model is used to examine the relation between family background
and labor market outcomes.
y2i = z1i1 + z2i2 + xi3 + u2i; (2)
si = 1 [wi + u3i > 0] ; (3)
where y2 is log hourly wages or log occupational prestige scores; s is the indicator variable that
equals one if y2 is observed during the sample period and zero otherwise; w is a vector of ob-
served characteristics that includes the number of siblings, mother's years of education, father's
years of education, maternal age at birth, maternal age at birth squared, log parental income, age,
age squared, father's age, father's age squared, log prefectural real GDP at the age of 16, and the
unemployment rate in the region where one spent the longest period of time during compulsory
education;14 and u2 and u3 are the jointly normally distributed error terms. The regional unem-
ployment rate serves as an excluded instrument. The regional unemployment rate is signicant
with a p-value of zero in all regressions. The model above is also used for the analysis of spousal
characteristics, in which log husband's income or log husband's occupational prestige is used as a
dependent variable, and spousal age and spousal age squared are additionally included as covari-
ates.
Finally, the duration model and the count data model are used to explore the inuence of family
background on family formation. The Cox proportional hazard model of singlehood duration (d)
can be written as
 (dj z) = 0 (d) (z (d)) ; (4)
where z = [z1; z2; x],  is the hazard function, 0 is a nonparametric baseline hazard, and  (z) =
exp (z). The data on duration until rst marriage is constructed from retrospective information
14The regional unemployment rate data are available from the Labor Force Survey. Japan's 47 prefectures are
classied into nine regions: Hokkaido, Tohoku, Southern Kanto, Northern Kanto and Koshin, Hokuriku, Tokai, Kinki,
Chugoku and Shikoku, Kyushu and Okinawa.
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about marriage history after the age of 15.15 The Poisson count-data regression model of fertility
is described by the probability mass function:
Pr (C = cj z) = exp [  (z)] [ (z)]c/ c!; c = 0; 1; 2; : : : ; (5)
where c is the number of children; and c! denotes the factorial. The analysis uses the negative bino-
mial model that extends the Poisson regression model in a way that relaxes the equidispersion prop-
erty and accommodates overdispersion. The negative binomial model species  (z) =  (z) ,
where  = exp (z), and  is the gamma density with mean one and variance . The mean and
variance are, then, E[cj; ] =  and Var[cj; ] =  (1 + ), respectively.
To summarize, according to the nature of the outcome variables, this study uses the linear
regression model for years of education, the probit model for having a university degree and at-
tending a preparatory school, the ordered probit model for participating in private tutoring schools
or enrichment courses, the sample selection model for own and spousal hourly wages and occu-
pational prestige, the duration model for marriage, and the count data model for fertility. Because
the nature of outcome variables differs across estimating models, the models are not estimated
simultaneously. The estimates are mostly precise, however. The impact of sibling composition is
specied in two ways to account for the gender composition of siblings and birth order for each
outcome.
4 Results
4.1 Educational attainment
The rst two columns of Table 6 present the results on years of education. Column 1 shows that
the number of sisters and the number of brothers decrease years of education. Maternal education
and paternal education increase children's years of education. The effects of sisters (maternal
education) do not statistically differ from the effects of brothers (paternal education). Maternal age
at birth has a positive effect, but its square has a negative effect, indicating that years of education
15The legal age for marriage is 18 for males and 16 for females. Parental consent is required if under the age of 20.
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increase as maternal age at birth increases up to a certain age and then subsequently declines. The
implied partial effect is 0.023, and the turning point is the age of 31. Prefecture effects are jointly
statistically signicant with a p-value of zero, and the effect of prefectural GDP is positive and
marginally signicant. Column 2 shows that eldest daughters tend to have 0.25 longer years of
education than their younger sisters, holding sibship size constant. The inclusion of birth order
does not substantially change the effects of parental attributes.
The next two columns present the results on university degrees. Column 3 shows that sibship
size decreases the probability of holding a university degree. One additional sister decreases the
probability by 3.1 (1.4) percentage points in a family without sisters (with one sister), while one
additional brother decreases the probability by 4.6 (1.6) percentage points in a family without
brothers (with one brother). The result that the effects of brothers are stronger than the effects of
sisters is consistent with Ono (2004), who argues that family resources are allocated preferentially
to investment in sons in Japan, using the Social Stratication and Mobility Survey.16 Maternal
education and paternal education increase the probability of holding a university degree. Maternal
university degree has a greater impact than paternal university degree, which is similar to the result
emphasized by Edwards and Pasquale (2003) in their analysis of a multinomial logit model of post-
secondary education choice using the original cohorts of the JPSC. It should be noted, however,
that the lower university advancement rate of women among the older generation underlies this
result. A 10% increase in parental income increases the probability of holding a university degree
by 1.21 percentage points. Prefecture effects are jointly statistically signicant at the 2% level.
Column 4 shows that eldest daughters are 3.6 percentage points more likely to hold a university
degree. The effects of parental attributes do not change substantially after birth order is included.
Given that the sample mean of the probability of holding a university degree is 17.4%, sibling
composition, parental education, and parental income are economically signicant.
16Powell and Steelman (1989) nd that the number of brothers decreases the probability of receiving nancial
assistance for college education from parents more strongly than the number of sisters in the United States.
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4.2 Educational investment
The direct implication derived from the quality-quantity theory is for the relation between family
background and educational investment. The analysis of educational investment is conducted to
provide an explanation of the difference in educational attainment by family background. The last
two columns of Table 6 present the results for the probability of attending a preparatory school for
university entrance examination. One additional sister decreases this probability by 2.5 percentage
points in a family without sisters, while one additional brother decreases it by 1.6 (0.8) percentage
points in a family without brothers (with one brother). Maternal education has a stronger inuence
than paternal education, and the two effects jointly statistically differ at the 15% level. Attendance
at preparatory schools seems to reect mother's willingness more than father's. A 10% increase
in parental income increases the probability of attending a preparatory school by 0.53 percentage
points. Eldest daughters are 2.7 percentage points more likely to attend a preparatory school.
Overall, the results are similar to those for the analysis of educational attainment in terms of the
signs of estimated coefcients. The difference in educational investment is thus considered as a
factor of the difference in educational attainment by family background.
The difference may appear in investment in early education, such as private tutoring schools
and enrichment courses. Private tutoring schools typically conduct small-group lessons and offer
counseling to pass competitive exams. Attendance at private tutoring schools is prevalent in Japan
and some other East Asian countries and can make a signicant difference in students' academic
performance.17 Enrichment courses have been popular in Japan as a part of early education that
can enhance children's ability in a broad sense. Typical subjects of enrichment courses in which
Japanese children participate are sports (swimming, Judo, Kendo, gymnastics, baseball, soccer,
etc.), calligraphy, music (piano, violin, etc.), abacus, English, and painting.18 Table 7 classies the
17Benesse (2007) summarizes the results of an international comparative survey on actual conditions of study and
attitudes toward study, which was conducted for primary school students aged 10 and 11, in Tokyo, Seoul, Peking,
Helsinki, London, and Washington, D.C., in 2006. The sample was composed of 1,105 students from 33 schools in
Tokyo, 1,300 students from 19 schools in Seoul, 1,195 students from 14 schools in Peking, 526 students from 12
schools in Helsinki, 891 students from 19 schools in London, and 955 students from 11 schools in Washington, D.C.
According to Benesse (2007), in 2006, 51.6% of students in Tokyo, 72.9% of students in Seoul, and 76.6% of students
in Peking attended private tutoring schools, while 21.1% of students in Helsinki, 13.1% of students in London, and
7.2% of students in Washington, D.C. attended such schools. The average number of days a student attends private
tutoring school per week is 2.8 in Tokyo, 4.8 in Seoul, and 2.2 in Peking, and the total number of hours of attendance
at private tutoring school per week is 7.0 in Tokyo, 11.6 in Seoul, and 5.8 in Peking.
18According to Benesse (2007), in 1990, 43.5% of primary school students in Japan participated in sports, 31.4%
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sample into ve categories according to whether they attended private tutoring schools or enrich-
ment courses at each level of education.19 The proportion who participated in a private tutoring
school increases from 11.8% between rst and third grade, to 36.7% between fourth and sixth
grade, rises to 57.7% in junior high school, and then decreases to 18.2% in high school, because
many junior high school students prepare for the high school entrance examination, and because
not all high school students aim to advance to college. The proportion of those who attended
enrichment courses entailing tuition fees is 64.3% between rst and third grade, 68.1% between
fourth and sixth grade, 31.3% in junior high school, and 18.9% in high school. Enrichment courses
are popular among elementary school students, but enrollment tends to shift toward private tutor-
ing schools after late elementary school. Table 8 presents the regression results on investment in
early education. Overall, family background variables are fairly signicant, and the sign pattern
of those estimated coefcients is the same as in the analysis of educational attainment. Investment
in early education is also considered as a factor behind the difference in educational attainment by
family background.
4.3 Changes in family background effects
In keeping with the spirit of Article 26 of the Constitution, tuition, enrollment, and examination
fees were set uniformly for all departments of all national universities until 2003. However, the
nancial burden of higher education has substantially increased in the last few decades due to a rise
in college tuition fees and an increased need for preparatory schools. Tightening credit constraints
may increase the impact of family background on educational attainment.
Table 9 presents the results for the probability of holding a university degree when the sample
is split into cohorts of those born between 1959 and 1969 and those born between 1970 and 1979.
The proportion of those who hold a university degree is 13% for the 1960s cohorts and 22% for the
1970s cohorts. The average number of siblings is 1.48 for the 1960s cohorts and 1.43 for the 1970
cohorts, and the proportion of eldest daughters is 73.3% for the 1960s cohorts and 68.5% for the
1970s cohorts. Some family background variables have a greater impact for the 1970s cohorts than
in calligraphy, 27.0% in music, 17.5% in abacus, 13.2% in English, and 2.1% in painting.
19Those who studied with private tutors are classied as having attended private tutoring schools.
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for the 1960s cohorts. In particular, a 10% increase in parental income increases the probability
of holding a university degree by 1.50 percentage points for the 1970s cohorts as opposed to 0.90
percentage points for the 1960s cohorts. Moreover, the impact of sibship size is greater for the
younger cohorts. However, because the effects of sisters increase more than the effects of brothers,
the difference in the effects of sisters and brothers disappears for the 1970s cohorts, indicating
that there is no preferential allocation to investment in sons for the younger cohorts. This change
is considered as a factor contributing to the reduction of the gender gap in education in recent
decades. Maternal education and paternal education have slightly larger effects for the younger
cohorts, while maternal age at birth has a signicant effect only for the older cohorts. The size of
birth order effect is unchanged. Prefecture effects are jointly statistically signicant for the 1960s
cohorts at the 5% level but not for the 1970s cohorts at the 24% level, and the estimated coefcient
of the log real prefectural GDP is 0.64 with a standard error of 0.26 for the 1960s cohorts but
small and insignicant with a p-value of 0.53 for the 1970s cohorts. These results suggest a fall
in regional disparity in educational attainment conditional on family background. The effect of
studentteacher ratio is close to zero and insignicant for the 1960s cohorts, and negative and
insignicant for the 1970s cohorts.
4.4 Labor market outcomes
The rst two columns in Table 10 present the results for wages, and the last two columns present
the results for occupational prestige. Column 1 shows that the number of sisters and the number of
brothers decrease wages. One additional sister decreases wages by 6.6 (2.5) percentage points in a
family without sisters (with one sister), while one additional brother decreases wages by 7.9 (11.0)
percentage points in a family without brothers (with one brother). These results can be interpreted
as a consequence of the effects of brothers on university degrees being stronger than the effects of
sisters. Maternal education, especially maternal university degree, signicantly increases wages,
whereas paternal education does not. A 10% increase in parental income increases wages by
1.95%. Column 2 shows that eldest daughters tend to earn 8.3% higher wages. These results are
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consistent with the results for educational attainment and investment.20 The last two columns show
that larger sibship size decreases occupational prestige. Maternal education, paternal education,
and parental income increase occupational prestige. Eldest daughters tend to have 2.5% higher
occupational prestige scores. Overall, the signs of family background effects are mostly the same
for educational attainment and investment, wages, and occupational prestige, and the impact of
family background is found to persist in the labor market.
An analysis of employment was also conducted, in which the outcome variable takes a value
of one if the individual is employed and a value of zero if she is unemployed or is a housewife.
Except for birth order, family background characteristics have no signicant effect on employment.
The result regarding birth order is consistent with that of Sasaki's (2002), who nds that the eldest
son and the eldest daughter are more likely to live with parents and that co-residence with parents
increases the probability of labor market participation among married women, using the original
cohorts of the JPSC. Similar results were obtained for the ordered probit model in which the
outcome variable takes a value of two if an individual is a full-time employee, a value of one if
she is a part-time or temporary employee, and a value of zero if she is not employed. There seem
to be two effects cancelling each other out behind the unclear results of family background effects
on employment status. Higher productivity resulting from better family background increases the
probability of being employed, while the income effect resulting from better family background
reduces the probability of being employed.
4.5 Family formation
The rst half of the columns in Table 11 presents the results on fertility and singlehood duration.
The rst two columns show that a larger number of sisters or brothers accelerates the timing of
marriage. Higher maternal education delays the timing of marriage, whereas higher paternal edu-
20Education is the most likely channel linking family background and wages. Family background variables may be
useful as instruments to estimate the returns to education. The two-stage least squares estimate is 9.8% when father's
and mother's years of education are used as instruments and 26.1% when the numbers of brothers and sisters are
used as instruments, while the pooled OLS estimate of returns to education is 11.7%. Other covariates included are
a constant, age, age squared, maternal age at birth, father's occupation dummies, year dummies, and dummies for
the size of city where one lives currently. The results can be interpreted along the lines of Card (2001). Because the
marginal returns to education can be expressed as the weighted sum of two parameters regarding innate ability and the
extent of credit constraints, the two-stage least squares estimate of returns to education is highest (lowest) when the
instrument used affects high-ability (low-ability) and credit-constrained (credit-unconstrained) individuals.
14
cation does not. Higher maternal age at birth or higher parental income lengthens the singlehood
duration of children. Eldest daughters tend to delay the timing of marriage. The relative frequency
of number of children is 42.3 for zero, 15.2 for one, 29.8 for two, and 12.7 for three or more, and
the average number of children is 1.15. The next two columns show that the number of sisters
and the number of brothers increase fertility. Maternal education, paternal education, and parental
income decrease fertility. Birth order has no signicant effect on fertility. Overall, family back-
ground affects family formation, and the direction of family background effects on marriage and
fertility is the opposite of the direction of family background effects on educational attainment and
labor market outcomes. The results suggest that women who have higher opportunity costs tend to
delay marriage and have fewer children.
4.6 Spousal characteristics
The last half of the columns in Table 11 presents the results for husband's income and occupa-
tional prestige. Columns 5 and 6 show that sibship size decreases husband's income. The effects
of brothers are more signicant than the effects of sisters. Paternal education increases husband's
income, whereas maternal education does not. Lastly, a 10% increase in parental income increases
spousal income by 1.31%. These results can be interpreted as a consequence of assortative mating.
Similarly, the last two columns show signicant family background effects on the social status of
the husband. The number of sisters and the number of brothers decrease husband's occupational
prestige. Maternal education, paternal education, and parental income increase husband's occupa-
tional prestige. The partial effect of maternal age at birth is positive and signicant, and the optimal
age is 30 years. Overall, family background is signicantly associated with spousal characteristics,
and the direction of family background effects on the economic and social status of the husband is
the same as the direction of family background effects on educational attainment and investment
and labor market outcomes. The sign of the estimated effects would be somewhat surprising if one
expected a decline in the quality of those remaining single. The results suggest that assortative
mating plays an important role in intergenerational transmission of economic and social status.
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5 Conclusion
This paper has examined the impact of family background on educational attainment and invest-
ment, labor market outcomes, family formation, and spousal characteristics for Japanese women.
To summarize the main ndings, those who are raised with a small number of siblings by edu-
cated and rich parents tend to attend private tutoring schools, enrichment courses, and preparatory
schools for university entrance examination, advance their education, obtain high-status occupa-
tions, and earn higher wages. They are more likely to delay marriage and have fewer children
because of higher opportunity costs but tend to marry men who have high income and high-status
occupations as a consequence of assortative mating. Maternal education has a stronger inuence
on labor market outcomes and the timing of marriage than paternal education, while paternal ed-
ucation has a stronger inuence on the economic and social status of the husband than maternal
education. The effects of brothers on educational attainment and wages are stronger than the ef-
fects of sisters, suggesting that family resources are allocated preferentially to investment in sons.
Tightening credit constraints has increased the impact of sibship size and parental income on uni-
versity degrees over recent decades, but the difference between the effects of brothers and those
of sisters has disappeared for the younger cohorts. This change in the impact of siblings' gender
composition of siblings is considered as a factor in rising female education.
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Appendix
Occupational prestige scores
In the JPSC, occupation is classied into 15 categories: (1) self-employed worker in agriculture,
forestry, or shery, (2) family worker in agriculture, forestry, or shery, (3) self-employed worker
in a small-sized commercial, industrial, or service business with fewer than 10 employees, (4)
family worker in a small-sized commercial, industrial, or service business with fewer than 10 em-
ployees, (5) freelance professional (practicing physician, lawyer, writer, priest, ower arrangement
teacher, dancer, etc.), (6) managerial job (department manager or above in a company, section chief
or above in a public agency, etc.), (7) professional (doctor in a hospital, researcher, research asso-
ciate or above in a university, judge, etc.), (8) technician (engineer, programmer, nurse, dietitian,
etc.), (9) teacher (teacher in an elementary school, junior high school, senior high school, vo-
cational school, professional school, or kindergarten), (10) clerical job (clerical staff, sales staff,
bank clerk, etc.), (11) craft and laborer job (factory worker, police, telephone operator, typist, de-
liveryman, driver, craftsman, etc.), (12) sales and service job (shop employee, salesperson, barber,
hairdresser, waiter, home-care worker, etc.), (13) home worker, (14) other, and (15) not employed.
The occupational prestige scores used in this study are based on the results of Treiman (1977)
for occupational prestige scores in Japan. The means of occupational prestige scores for the oc-
cupational titles on the list in Treiman (1977) are given for each occupational category. The re-
gression results are essentially unchanged when the median is used instead of the mean. Table A1
enumerates occupational prestige scores for each occupational category, along with the occupa-
tional titles that are included in the category.21
21The rest of the occupational titles, such as captain of a large merchant ship, president of the Supreme Court,
rector at the University of Tokyo, manager of a professional baseball team, prime minister, prefect, president of the
diet, member of the diet, minister of state, union leader, secretary general of a large labor union, sleeping car porter,
peddler/street stall keeper, shoe shiner, gold miner/coal miner, and charcoal miner, are not used in the analysis.
17
References
[1] Becker, G. S. (1991). A Treatise on the Family, Harvard University Press.
[2] Becker, G. S. and H. G. Lewis, (1973). On the Interaction between the Quantity and Quality
of Children, Journal of Political Economy, 81(2), S279-S288.
[3] Becker, G. S. and N. Tomes, (1976). Child Endowments and the Quantity and Quality of
Children, Journal of Political Economy, 84(4), S143-S162.
[4] Behrman, J. R., R. A. Pollak, and P. Taubman, (1982). Parental Preferences and Provision
for Progeny, Journal of Political Economy, 90(1), 52-73
[5] Behrman, J. R., R. A. Pollak, P. Taubman, (1989). Family Resources, Family Size, and
Access to Financing for College Education, Journal of Political Economy, 97(2), 398-419.
[6] Behrman, J. R. and P. Taubman, (1986). Birth Order, Schooling, and Earnings, Journal of
Labor Economics, 4 (3), S121-S145.
[7] Behrman, J. R. and M. R. Rosenzweig, (2002). Does Increasing Women's Schooling Raise
the Schooling of the Next Generation? American Economic Review, 92(1), 323-334.
[8] Benesse, (2007). Basic Research on Academic Performance (in Japanese).
[9] Black, S. E. and P. J. Devereux, (2011). Recent Developments in Intergenerational Mobil-
ity, in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.) Handbook of Labor Economics, 4B, 1487-1541,
Elsevier.
[10] Booth, A. L. and H. J. Kee, (2009). Intergenerational Transmission of Fertility Patterns,
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 71(2), 183208
[11] Butcher, K. F. and A. Case, (1994). The Effect of Sibling Sex Composition on Women's
Education and Earnings, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(3), 531-563.
[12] Card, D. (2001). Estimating the Return to Schooling: Progress on Some Persistent Econo-
metric Problems, Econometrica, 69(5), 1127-1160.
18
[13] Chadwick, L. and G. Solon, (2002). Intergenerational Income Mobility among Daughters,
American Economic Review, 92(1), 335-344.
[14] Edwards, L. N. and M. K. Pasquale, (2003). Women's Higher Education in Japan: Family
Background, Economic Factors, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Law, Journal of
the Japanese and International Economies, 17(1), 1-32.
[15] Ermisch, J. and M. Francesconi, (2001). Family Matters: Impacts of Family Background on
Educational Attainments, Economica, 68(270), 137-156.
[16] Fernández, R. and A. Fogli, (2006). Fertility: The Role of Culture and Family Experience,
Journal of the European Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, 4(2-3), 552-561.
[17] Francesconi, M. and C. Nicoletti, (2006). Intergenerational Mobility and Sample Selection
in Short Panels, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 21(8), 1265-1293.
[18] Griliches, Z. (1979). Sibling Models and Data in Economics: Beginnings of a Survey,
Journal of Political Economy, 87(5), S37-64.
[19] Hanushek, E. A. (1992). The Trade-off between Child Quantity and Quality, Journal of
Political Economy, 100(1), 84-117.
[20] Kahn, J. R. and K. E. Anderson, (1992). Intergenerational Patterns of Teenage Fertility,
Demography, 29(1), 39-57.
[21] Kane, T. J. (1994). College Entry by Blacks since 1970: The Role of College Costs, Family
Background, and the Returns to Education, Journal of Political Economy, 102(5), 878-911.
[22] Kessler, D. (1991). Birth Order, Family Size, and Achievement: Family Structure and Wage
Determination, Journal of Labor Economics, 9(4), 413-426.
[23] Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, (2008). International Com-
parison of Education Indicators (in Japanese).
[24] OECD, (2010). Highlights from Education at a Glance 2010.
19
[25] Ono, H. (2004). Are Sons and Daughters Substitutable?: Allocation of Family Resources in
Contemporary Japan, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 18(2), 143-160.
[26] Olneck, M. R. and D. B. Bills, (1979). Family Conguration and Achievement: Effects of
Birth Order and Family Size in a Sample of Brothers, Social Psychology Quarterly, 42(2),
135-148.
[27] Parish, W. L. and R. J. Willis, (1993).Daughters, Education, and Family Budgets: Taiwan
Experiences, Journal of Human Resources, 28(4), 863-898.
[28] Powell, B. and L. C. Steelman, (1989). The Liability of Having Brothers: Paying for College
and the Sex Composition of the Family, Sociology of Education, 62(2), 134-147.
[29] Raymo, J. M., M. Iwasawa, and L. Bumpass, (2009). Cohabitation and Family Formation in
Japan, Demography, 46(4), 785-803.
[30] Rosenzweig, M. R. and K. I. Wolpin, (1980). Testing the Quantity-Quality Fertility Model:
The Use of Twins as a Natural Experiment, Econometrica, 48(1), 227-240.
[31] Rosenzweig, M. R. and K. I. Wolpin, (1995). Sisters, Siblings, and Mothers: The Effect
of Teen-age Childbearing on Birth Outcomes in a Dynamic Family Context, Econometrica,
63(2), 303-326.
[32] Sasaki, M. (2002). The Casual Effect of Family Structure on Labor Force Participation
among Japanese Married Women, Journal of Human Resources, 37(2), 429-440.
[33] Solon, G. (1992). Intergenerational Income Mobility in the United States, American Eco-
nomic Review, 82(3), 393-408.
[34] Solon, G. (1999). Intergenerational Mobility in the Labor Market, in O. Ashenfelter and D.
Card (eds.) Handbook of Labor Economics, 3(1), 1761-1800, Elsevier.
[35] Tanaka, R. (2008). The Gender-asymmetric Effect of Working Mothers on Children's Edu-
cation: Evidence from Japan, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 22(4),
586-604.
20
[36] Todd, P. E. and K. I. Wolpin, (2003). On the Specication and Estimation of the Production
Function for Cognitive Achievement, The Economic Journal, 113(485), F3F33.
[37] Treiman, D. J. (1977). Occupational Prestige in Comparative Perspective, Academic Press.
[38] Ueda, A. (2009). Intergenerational Mobility of Earnings and Income in Japan, The B.E.
Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 9(1), Article 54.
21
22 
 
 
Table 1: How much of your tuition fees and living expenses for school did your parents cover? 
(1) (2) (3) 
  Vocational School Two-year College Four-year College 
Almost all 62.6% 79.5% 71.1% 
Most 13.0 13.9 21.1 
Some 10.1 3.3 4.9 
Little  14.0 3.1 2.6 
No response 0.4 0.2 0.2 
Observations 516 541 426 
 
 
 
Table 2: Parental Income and Children’s Education 
(1) (2) (3) 
  Parental Income 
Low Middle High 
Yrs. education = 9 6.0% 2.4% 1.3% 
= 12 50.0 32.9 17.0 
= 14 35.4 44.0 43.4 
≥ 16 8.6 20.7 38.4 
Observations 1,092 860 318 
Notes: Parental income per year for the low-, middle-, and high-income groups is less than five million yen, greater 
than or equal to five million yen but less than 10 million yen, and greater than or equal to 10 million yen, respectively. 
Parental income is the average parental income over the sample period. 
 
 
Table 3: Educational Assortative Mating 
  Husband’s years of education Total 
= 9 = 12 = 14 ≥ 16  
Years of education = 9 34 29 5 3 71 
= 12 76 384 97 105 662 
= 14 35 202 110 252 599 
≥ 16 1 18 19 162 200 
Total 146 633 231 522 1,532 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics 
(1) (2) (3) 
  Percent  Percent   Mean [S.D.]
No. of siblings Yrs. education Age 27.42 [2.83]
0 6.96 9 4.01
1 52.20 12 38.90 No. of siblings 1.46 [0.87]
2 32.42 14 39.74
3+ 8.4 16+ 17.36 No. of sisters 0.74 [0.76]
No. of sisters Mother’s yrs. education No. of brothers 0.72 [0.74]
0 42.07 9 33.08
1 45.81 12 50.44 Mother’s yrs. 11.42 [1.94]
2+ 12.11 14 12.47 education 
16+ 4.01 Father’s yrs. 11.82 [2.48]
No. of brothers education 
0 41.98 Father’s yrs. education Maternal age 27.35 [3.92]
1 44.36 9 33.88 at birth 
2+ 13.66 12 42.60 Father’s age 57.72 [5.24]
14 5.29
Eldest daughter 70.97 16+ 18.24 Parental income 6.81 [4.09]
Second daughter 24.80    (millions of yen)  
Notes: A total of 2,270 individuals are included. Parental income is the average parental income over the sample 
period. 
 
Table 5: Intergenerational Correlations 
  Age-adjusted 
Observations 
Correlation Coefficients 
(1)  Own and maternal education 0.360 {0.00} 2,270 
(2)  Own and paternal education 0.395 {0.00} 2,270 
(3)  Own wages and parental income 0.199 {0.00} 1,722 
(4)  Own occupational prestige and paternal income 0.140 {0.00} 1,880 
(5)  No. of children and no. of siblings 0.096 {0.00} 2,270 
(6)  Age at first marriage and maternal age at birth 0.061 {0.01} 1,532 
(7)  Spousal and parental income 0.244 {0.00} 1,424 
(8)  Spousal occupational prestige and parental income 0.280 {0.00} 1,525 
Notes: Figures in curly brackets are p-values. The average values over the sample period are used for parental income, 
wages, occupational prestige, and spousal income, and the value in the last observation is used for the number of 
children. The correlation coefficient in rows (3), (4), and (5) is adjusted by partialling out age, age squared, father’s 
age, and father’s age squared. Husband’s age and husband’s age squared are additionally partialled out in rows (7) and 
(8). The correlation coefficient in row (6) is adjusted by partialling out age and age squared. 
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Table 6: Educational Attainment and Investment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS Probit Probit 
Years of Education University Degrees: = 1 Preparatory School: = 1 
No. of sisters = 1 -0.289 – -0.031 – -0.025 – (0.077) (0.017) (0.012) 
  ≥ 2 -0.505 – -0.045 – -0.017 – (0.107) (0.020) (0.015) 
No. of brothers = 1 -0.279 – -0.046 – -0.016 – (0.076) (0.017) (0.012) 
  ≥ 2 -0.528 – -0.062 – -0.024 – (0.116) (0.019) (0.015) 
Eldest daughter – 0.245 – 0.036 – 0.027 (0.077) (0.016) (0.011) 
No. of siblings = 1 – -0.135 – -0.047 – -0.026 (0.137) (0.028) (0.020) 
    = 2 – -0.342 – -0.069 – -0.023 (0.144) (0.025) (0.018) 
    ≥ 3 – -0.666 – -0.045 – -0.030 (0.187) (0.029) (0.019) 
Mother’s yrs. 0.371 0.360 0.039 0.056 0.067 0.065 
education = 12 (0.085) (0.084) (0.021) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) 
0.451 0.435 0.078 0.107 0.126 0.122 
 = 14 (0.132) (0.130) (0.036) (0.038) (0.040) (0.039) 
1.226 1.201 0.366 0.412 0.287 0.279 
 ≥ 16 (0.170) (0.170) (0.073) (0.072) (0.077) (0.076) 
Father’s yrs. 0.368 0.367 0.079 0.099 0.010 0.010 
education = 12 (0.084) (0.084) (0.023) (0.023) (0.016) (0.016) 
0.492 0.481 0.062 0.087 0.024 0.021 
 = 14 (0.159) (0.158) (0.047) (0.050) (0.032) (0.031) 
1.074 1.057 0.247 0.313 0.089 0.086 
 ≥ 16 (0.116) (0.115) (0.041) (0.042) (0.029) (0.029) 
Maternal age at birth 0.203 0.221 0.023 0.037 0.006 0.009 
(0.092) (0.094) (0.022) (0.024) (0.013) (0.014) 
Maternal age at birth -0.329 -0.351 -0.043 -0.069 -0.007 -0.012 
squared/100 (0.163) (0.165) (0.038) (0.042) (0.024) (0.024) 
log parental income 0.783 0.779 0.121 0.121 0.053 0.052 
(0.065) (0.065) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) 
Mean [S.D] of regressand 13.4 [1.71] 0.174 [0.379] 0.102 [0.302] 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.29 0.29 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 
Notes: A total of 2,270 individuals are included from columns 1 to 4, and a total of 2,261 individuals are included in 
columns 5 and 6. Partial effects are reported in all columns. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. The other covariates are a constant, age, age squared, father’s age, father’s age squared, the log 
prefectural real GDP at the age of 16, and dummies for the prefecture where one spent childhood. The base group 
comprises those who have no siblings and whose parents have less than 12 years of education. 
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Table 7: Do you have experience attending private tutoring school, enrichment courses, or both? 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Grades 1–3 Grades 4–6 Junior High High School 
Both 6.6% 22.7% 21.9% 5.8% 
Private tutoring school 5.2 14.0 35.8 12.4 
Enrichment courses 57.7 45.4 9.4 13.1 
Neither  29.4 17.5 31.8 67.3 
No response 1.1 0.5 1.1 1.5 
Observations 2,648 2,605 
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Table 8: Investment in Early Education Outside of School 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ordered Probit 
 
Both Private Tutoring School and Enrichment Courses: = 2 
Either: = 1 
Neither: = 0 
Grades 1–3 Grades 4–6 Junior High High School 
No. of sisters = 1 -0.215 – -0.271 – -0.179 – -0.184 – (0.063) (0.059) (0.059) (0.065) 
  ≥ 2 -0.550 – -0.505 – -0.360 – -0.360 – (0.090) (0.087) (0.082) (0.101) 
No. of brothers = 1 -0.090 – -0.149 – -0.013 – -0.156 – (0.063) (0.059) (0.058) (0.065) 
  ≥ 2 -0.359 – -0.432 – -0.151 – -0.216 – (0.094) (0.089) (0.084) (0.103) 
Eldest daughter – 0.111 – 0.190 – 0.239 – 0.219 (0.063) (0.059) (0.058) (0.068) 
No. of siblings = 1 – -0.191 – -0.274 – 0.117 – -0.006 (0.110) (0.104) (0.104) (0.107) 
    = 2 – -0.368 – -0.414 – -0.030 – -0.182 (0.116) (0.108) (0.108) (0.114) 
    ≥ 3 – -0.664 – -0.754 – -0.174 – -0.253 (0.143) (0.136) (0.134) (0.154) 
Mother’s yrs. 0.262 0.257 0.305 0.296 0.270 0.258 0.206 0.194 
education = 12 (0.078) (0.078) (0.069) (0.069) (0.065) (0.065) (0.080) (0.080) 
0.262 0.261 0.302 0.294 0.317 0.302 0.393 0.382 
 = 14 (0.109) (0.109) (0.104) (0.104) (0.099) (0.099) (0.109) (0.110) 
0.275 0.253 0.174 0.144 0.160 0.127 0.423 0.404 
 ≥ 16 (0.151) (0.152) (0.157) (0.160) (0.160) (0.161) (0.145) (0.147) 
Father’s yrs. 0.267 0.267 0.153 0.155 0.086 0.081 0.078 0.073 
education = 12 (0.076) (0.076) (0.067) (0.068) (0.066) (0.066) (0.080) (0.080) 
0.252 0.253 0.252 0.248 0.327 0.320 0.248 0.235 
 = 14 (0.140) (0.140) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.121) (0.143) (0.142) 
0.312 0.306 0.243 0.233 0.295 0.283 0.410 0.400 
 ≥ 16 (0.096) (0.096) (0.093) (0.094) (0.092) (0.092) (0.101) (0.101) 
Maternal age at birth 0.074 0.083 -0.015 0.001 0.037 0.050 -0.016 -0.001 
(0.069) (0.070) (0.064) (0.064) (0.061) (0.062) (0.071) (0.072) 
Maternal age at birth -0.130 -0.143 0.041 0.019 -0.062 -0.075 0.059 0.043 
squared/100 (0.122) (0.124) (0.112) (0.113) (0.107) (0.109) (0.125) (0.126) 
log parental income 0.399 0.396 0.352 0.350 0.384 0.383 0.471 0.474 
(0.055) (0.055) (0.051) (0.051) (0.049) (0.049) (0.056) (0.056) 
Notes: The number of observations is 2,244 in columns 1 and 2, 2,259 in columns 3 and 4, 2,248 in columns 5 and 6, 
and 2,238 individuals in columns 7 and 8, respectively. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
The other covariates are a constant, age, age squared, father’s age, father’s age squared, the log prefectural real GDP 
at the age of 16, and dummies for the prefecture where one spent childhood. 
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Table 9: Changes in the Family Background Effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Probit 
University Degrees: = 1 
1960s Cohort 1970s Cohort 
No. of sisters = 1 -0.010 
– 
-0.055 
– (0.019) (0.030) 
  ≥ 2 -0.035 
– 
-0.070 
– (0.021) (0.034) 
No. of brothers = 1 -0.032 
– 
-0.053 
– (0.019) (0.029) 
  ≥ 2 -0.047 
– 
-0.069 
– (0.021) (0.033) 
Eldest daughter 
– 
0.045 
– 
0.044 
(0.018) (0.027) 
No. of siblings = 1 
– 
0.005 
– 
-0.102 
(0.030) (0.048) 
    = 2 
– 
-0.012 
– 
-0.125 
(0.031) (0.042) 
    ≥ 3 
– 
-0.029 
– 
-0.051 
(0.033) (0.050) 
Mother’s yrs. 0.018 0.014 0.066 0.064 
education = 12 (0.022) (0.022) (0.041) (0.041) 
0.097 0.096 0.077 0.076 
 = 14 (0.052) (0.052) (0.059) (0.057) 
0.383 0.380 0.407 0.395 
 ≥ 16 (0.133) (0.133) (0.098) (0.098) 
Father’s yrs. 0.086 0.083 0.092 0.095 
education = 12 (0.026) (0.026) (0.039) (0.039) 
0.012 0.006 0.127 0.141 
 = 14 (0.049) (0.047) (0.085) (0.087) 
0.256 0.245 0.290 0.293 
 ≥ 16 (0.060) (0.059) (0.061) (0.061) 
Maternal age at birth 0.052 0.054 0.009 0.018 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.036) (0.037) 
Maternal age at birth -0.100 -0.104 -0.009 -0.023 
squared/100 (0.042) (0.042) (0.063) (0.065) 
log parental income 0.090 0.088 0.150 0.151 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) 
Mean [S.D] of regressand 0.13 [0.34] 0.22 [0.41] 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.23 
Notes: A total of 1,178 observations are included in columns 1 and 2, and a total of 1,092 observations are included in 
columns 3 and 4. Partial effects are reported in all columns. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. The other covariates are a constant, age, age squared, father’s age, father’s age squared, the log 
prefectural real GDP at the age of 16, the student–teacher ratio at the age of 16, and dummies for the prefecture where 
one spent childhood.  
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Table 10: Labor Market Outcomes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample Selection Sample Selection 
 log Hourly Wages 
log Occupational 
Prestige 
No. of sisters = 1 -0.066 – -0.033 – (0.035) (0.010) 
  ≥ 2 -0.091 – -0.042 – (0.060) (0.014) 
No. of brothers = 1 -0.079 – -0.014 – (0.035) (0.010) 
  ≥ 2 -0.189 – -0.052 – (0.057) (0.015) 
Eldest daughter – 0.083 – 0.025 (0.032) (0.010) 
No. of siblings = 1 – -0.057 – -0.007 (0.059) (0.017) 
    = 2 – -0.130 – -0.031 (0.068) (0.018) 
    ≥ 3 – -0.148 – -0.051 (0.092) (0.022) 
Mother’s yrs. 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.024 
education = 12 (0.046) (0.046) (0.011) (0.011) 
0.107 0.108 0.060 0.058 
 = 14 (0.069) (0.069) (0.017) (0.017) 
0.210 0.207 0.071 0.069 
 ≥ 16 (0.096) (0.096) (0.024) (0.025) 
Father’s yrs. -0.016 -0.009 0.004 0.004 
education = 12 (0.041) (0.041) (0.011) (0.011) 
-0.017 -0.019 0.009 0.008 
 = 14 (0.068) (0.069) (0.022) (0.022) 
0.000 -0.003 0.044 0.042 
 ≥ 16 (0.067) (0.067) (0.015) (0.015) 
Maternal age at birth -0.022 -0.011 0.017 0.018 
(0.049) (0.049) (0.012) (0.012) 
Maternal age at birth 0.037 0.022 -0.026 -0.028 
squared/100 (0.087) (0.087) (0.021) (0.021) 
log parental income 0.195 0.192 0.036 0.036 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.009) (0.009) 
Correlation coefficient -0.971 -0.971 -0.054 -0.054 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.045) (0.046) 
Notes: A total of 2,270 individuals are included. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. The 
other covariates are a constant, age, age squared, father’s age, father’s age squared, the log prefectural real GDP at the 
age of 16, and dummies for the prefecture where one spent childhood. The models are estimated by the maximum 
likelihood method.
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Table 11: Family Formation and Spousal Characteristics 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Cox Proportional 
Hazard Negative Binomial Sample Selection Sample Selection 
 Singlehood Duration No. of Children log Spousal Income 
log Spousal Occupa- 
tional Prestige 
No. of sisters = 1 0.049 – 0.059 – -0.019 – -0.025 – 
(0.060) (0.044) (0.021) (0.012) 
  ≥ 2 0.220 – 0.098 – -0.012 – -0.054 – 
(0.083) (0.057) (0.030) (0.015) 
No. of brothers = 1 -0.017 – 0.029 – -0.031 – -0.021 – 
(0.059) (0.044) (0.021) (0.011) 
  ≥ 2 0.202 – 0.221 – -0.071 – -0.042 – 
(0.093) (0.064) (0.032) (0.015) 
Eldest daughter – -0.159 – -0.031 – -0.019 – 0.027 
(0.061) (0.046) (0.021) (0.011) 
No. of siblings = 1 – 0.058 – 0.064 – -0.048 – 0.042 
(0.103) (0.084) (0.037) (0.020) 
    = 2 – 0.125 – 0.103 – -0.076 – 0.007 
(0.107) (0.087) (0.039) (0.021) 
    ≥ 3 – 0.238 – 0.273 – -0.064 – -0.017 
(0.139) (0.101) (0.048) (0.025) 
Mother’s yrs. -0.146 -0.143 -0.044 -0.045 0.016 0.017 0.023 0.022 
education = 12 (0.066) (0.066) (0.048) (0.048) (0.024) (0.024) (0.012) (0.012) 
-0.176 -0.178 -0.188 -0.183 -0.020 -0.020 0.046 0.045 
 = 14 (0.100) (0.100) (0.091) (0.091) (0.036) (0.036) (0.020) (0.020) 
-0.459 -0.452 -0.106 -0.100 -0.007 0.000 0.050 0.046 
 ≥ 16 (0.158) (0.159) (0.161) (0.161) (0.073) (0.073) (0.035) (0.036) 
Father’s yrs. 0.010 0.009 -0.061 -0.061 -0.010 -0.008 0.003 0.001 
education = 12 (0.065) (0.065) (0.047) (0.047) (0.024) (0.024) (0.012) (0.012) 
-0.011 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.048 0.048 0.001 0.001 
 = 14 (0.124) (0.123) (0.094) (0.093) (0.046) (0.046) (0.022) (0.022) 
-0.085 -0.072 -0.205 -0.200 0.071 0.072 0.057 0.057 
 ≥ 16 (0.093) (0.094) (0.084) (0.083) (0.035) (0.035) (0.019) (0.019) 
Maternal age at birth -0.135 -0.150 -0.048 -0.049 -0.019 -0.019 0.024 0.025 
(0.056) (0.056) (0.041) (0.041) (0.024) (0.024) (0.010) (0.010) 
Maternal age at birth 0.213 0.235 0.058 0.058 0.024 0.023 -0.041 -0.041 
squared/100 (0.100) (0.101) (0.073) (0.073) (0.042) (0.042) (0.017) (0.017) 
log parental income -0.225 -0.222 -0.226 -0.223 0.131 0.132 0.078 0.077 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.041) (0.041) (0.020) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010) 
Correlation coefficient 
– – – – 
0.638 0.638 -0.032 -0.020 
(0.094) (0.093 (0.103) (0.107) 
Notes: In columns 1 and 2, a total of 25,630 observations from 2,270 individuals are included, and standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the individual level. In columns 3 to 8, a total of 2,270 individuals are included, and 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Partial effects are reported in all columns. The other 
covariates are a constant, age, age squared, father’s age, father’s age squared, the log prefectural real GDP at the age 
of 16, and dummies for the prefecture where one spent childhood. Husband’s age and husband’s age squared are 
additionally included in columns 5 to 8. The models are estimated by the maximum likelihood method. 
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Figure 1: Costs for National Universities 
 
Notes: Costs for national universities are calculated by enrollment fees plus tuition fees for four years and normalized 
by the consumer price index (the base year is 2000). 
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Figure 2: Kaplan-Meiler Estimates for the Survival Function of Singlehood Duration 
Panel A: Number of Siblings 
  
Panel B: Parental Education 
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Table A1: Occupational Prestige Scores 
  JPSC 
Category 
Prestige 
Scores Occupational Titles in Treiman (1977)   
(1) Self-employed 
in agriculture 
33.8 Farm owner/head of a family farm, tenant farmer, agricultural 
laborer, fisherman, operator of a fishing boat, harpooner on a 
whaleboat   
(2) Family worker 
in agriculture 
33.5 Unpaid family farm worker 
(3) Self-employed 38.8 Shopkeeper/owner of a green grocery shop 
(4) Family worker 34.7 Department store salesman/shop clerk/supermarket sales 
clerk/salesman in a bookstore/hardware store clerk/sales clerk in 
green grocery, barber, hair dresser, operator of a hair dressing 
salon   
(5) Freelance 
professional 
62.1 Lawyer, director of a large hospital, priest in a Buddhist temple, 
novelist, composer, actor/movie performer, cinema director, 
television announcer   
(6) Managerial 
job 
63.8 Department head in a government agency, department head in a 
municipal office, president of a large company, owner of a 
medium or small factory, department head in a private company, 
department head in a large company, officer of a large 
company/corporate executive 
  
(7) Professional 76.5 Physicist, airline pilot, botanist, cancer researcher, 
physician/ophthalmologist, economist, judge, local court judge, 
university professor   
(8) Technician 57.4 Civil engineer, electrical engineer, mechanical engineer, mining 
engineer, nurse, newspaper reporter, engineer on new Tokaido 
line/steam locomotive engineer/electric train engineer   
(9) Teacher 56.0 Elementary school teacher 
(10) Clerical job 45.2 Private secretary, office employee in a large company/office 
worker in a private company/office employee in a large spinning 
mill, office worker in a government office, airline office 
employee/office employee in the Tokyo central railroad 
station/railroad station office employee 
  
(11) Craft and 
laborer job 
33.8 Policeman, spinner in a large hill/textile spinning machine 
operator, worker in a macaroni factory/worker in a bread 
bakery/worker in udon factory, tailor, furniture maker, turner, 
automobile repairman, operator of a service station, printer, 
carpenter, master carpenter, construction laborer, generator 
operator in a new and powerful steam power plant/generator 
operator in a steam power plant, porter, bus driver, driver/driver 
of a mail truck/driver of a garbage truck, road worker, air force 
enlisted man/army enlisted man 
  
(12) Sales and 
service job 
34.6 Insurance agent, department store salesman/shop 
clerk/supermarket sales clerk/salesman in a bookstore/hardware 
store clerk/sales clerk in green grocery, automobile salesman, 
filling station attendant, hotel keeper, head clerk in a Japanese 
style inn, barber, hair dresser, operator of a hair dressing salon, 
bell captain in a hotel. 
   
 
